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ABSTRACT
Vulnerability and resilience to extreme weather hazards are a function of diverse physical, social, and
psychological factors. Previous research has focused on individual factors that influence public perceptions of
hazards, such as politics, ideology, and cultural worldviews, as well as on socioeconomic and demographic
factors that affect geographically based vulnerability, environmental justice, and community resilience. Few
studies have investigated individual socioeconomic and racial/ethnic differences in public risk perceptions of
the health hazards associated with extreme heat events, which are now increasing due to climate change. This
study uses multilevel statistical modeling to investigate individual- and geographic-level (e.g., census tract
level and regional) social, economic, and biophysical influences on public perceptions of the adverse health
impacts associated with heat waves. Political orientation and climate change beliefs are the strongest
predictors of heat wave health risk perceptions; household income also has a relatively strong and consistent
effect. Contextual socioeconomic vulnerability, measured with a social vulnerability index at the census tract
level, also significantly affects heat wave risk perceptions. The strong influence of political orientation
and climate beliefs on perceptions of adverse health impacts from heat waves suggests that ideological
predispositions can increase vulnerability to climate change.
1. Introduction
Heat is the leading cause of weather-related mortality
in the United States and is a hazard with which much of
the population has direct experience (Borden and
Cutter 2008). Recent research suggests that individuals
in areas of greater social vulnerability more often per-
ceive heat wave health risks, holding constant political
attitudes and beliefs about climate change (Akerlof
et al. 2015). Heat is a health hazard that is expected to
increase in frequency and intensity as the climate con-
tinues to warm (IPCC 2014). Public perception of cli-
mate change, including the causes, consequences, and
associated risks to human health and well-being, has
been investigated across multiple social and behavioral
science disciplines (Swim et al. 2009, 2011; Dunlap and
Brulle 2015). One of the persistent challenges, however,
has been to identify the effects (if any) that physical
changes to the environment (e.g., weather, plant and
animal life, pollution) and geographically based socio-
demographic factors (e.g., geographically based social
vulnerability) have on public perceptions of climate
change and its consequences. To design more effective
communication strategies to reduce heat-related illness
and injury, it will be vital for local, regional, and national
organizations and agencies to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the factors that shape public percep-
tions of the health risks posed by heat waves.
A key hurdle in this challenge, however, is that
individual-level political attitudes and beliefs about en-
vironmental issues, such as climate change, may influence
risk perceptions as much or more than sociodemographic
and physical environmental factors, thus amplifying
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individuals’ vulnerabilities. Therefore, ideological pre-
dispositions and beliefs and attitudes about climate
change can be considered vulnerability factors alongside
sociodemographic vulnerability. This study combines in-
sights from the literatures on social vulnerability and
public beliefs and attitudes about climate change in order
to investigate the individual- and geographic-level soci-
odemographic and biophysical factors that may influence
individuals’ perceptions of the health risks associated
with heat waves.
Part of the challenge in answering how environmental
changes might affect public perceptions of risks stems
from the diverse methodological approaches used by
various scientific disciplines and traditions attempting to
unpack this question. Social scientists have increasingly
turned to the integration of biophysical and social survey
data to include objective measures of environmental
phenomena, such as floods, temperature trends, and
other weather events, alongside individual-level socio-
demographic predictors of public attitudes and percep-
tions (Egan and Mullin 2012; Goebbert et al. 2012;
Howe et al. 2013; Hamilton and Lemcke-Stampone
2014; Zaval et al. 2014; Hamilton et al. 2016; Shao
et al. 2017, 2018). In parallel, geographers have in-
vestigated the links between spatially concentrated
vulnerabilities (e.g., clustering of multiple socioeco-
nomic disadvantages) at different geographic levels
(e.g., state, county, census tract, block group) and spe-
cific environmental hazards, in the case of floods, ex-
treme heat, and disaster declarations (Cutter et al. 2003;
Johnson et al. 2012). As a result of largely non-
overlapping research aims, these different literatures
have left open questions that correspond with and could
potentially be answered by each other’s best insights.
For example, individual-level beliefs and attitudes are
embedded in geographically specific social and eco-
nomic structures that condition their character to some
degree. Geographically based vulnerabilities (i.e., so-
cioeconomic characteristics of communities at various
geographic levels such as census tracts or block groups)
may also condition individual-level perceptions of risks
due to increased exposure to hazards.
Specifically, this research explores four interrelated
questions about individuals’ perceptions of the risks
heat waves pose to their own health and the health of
others in their communities:
1) Howmight individuals’ political ideologies and beliefs
about the reality and causes of climate change influ-
ence their perceptions of the risks posed by heatwaves
to themselves and others within their communities?
2) How might individual-level sociodemographic char-
acteristics relate to individuals’ perceptions about
the risks heat waves pose to their own health and the
health of those around them?
3) How might geographic-level socioeconomic charac-
teristics influence such perceptions?
4) How might objectively measured exposure to local
heat waves influence such perceptions and net of




Recent research suggests that while the public is gen-
erally aware that climate change poses risks to human
health, this awareness lacks specificity and is relatively
shallow. A 2014 national survey compared respondents’
answers to both open- and closed-ended survey questions
about human health risks related to climate change and
found that although the majority of the public said cli-
mate change will be harmful to human health, only about
one-quarter were able to identify one or more specific
types of harm (Maibach et al. 2015). Perhaps more im-
portantly, most Americans responded by saying they had
given little thought to the potential health consequences
of climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2014), suggesting
that climate change impacts on local weather and ex-
treme events have either not resonatedwith individuals in
their everyday lives, or the majority of communities in
America have simply not yet noticed the impacts of a
changing climate. Alternatively (or in addition), it could
be that Americans continue to see climate change as a
relatively distant threat that posesmore harm topeople in
developing nations or to future generations than to
themselves, to their family and friends, or to others in
their communities (Leiserowitz 2005; Akerlof et al. 2010;
Leiserowitz et al. 2017). Since most of the public does not
view climate change as a significant personal health risk,
climate-related hazards may pose an even greater health
threat in the near future if people inadequately prepare
for or respond to the increasing risks. A deeper un-
derstanding of the particular social factors that influence
public concern about heat wave health risks will be crit-
ical for organizations working to conduct effective com-
munication campaigns to prevent or reduce heat-related
health impacts. Whether and to what extent individuals
perceive their own relative vulnerabilities is an important
factor for policymakers and organizations involved in
disaster preparation and response to consider.
b. Individual-level influences on risk perceptions
Though there has been much research on beliefs,
attitudes, and risk perceptions related to climate change,
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the majority of studies have focused on identifying and
explaining what Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) referred
to as the ‘‘social bases of environmental concern.’’ From
the ‘‘age, social class, residence, political, and sex hy-
potheses’’ (see Van Liere and Dunlap 1980) emerged
myriad studies over the following decades charting the
sociodemographic correlates of individual beliefs, atti-
tudes, perceptions of risks, and norms of behavior with
respect to environmental issues and problems—most
notably, in recent years, the social and political di-
mensions of climate change beliefs. In addition to
individual-level sociodemographic indicators, some of
which are meant to capture individual-level vulnerabil-
ity, this study also considers the influence of political
ideology and global warming beliefs on heat wave health
risk perceptions. Many studies have shown a consistent
and relatively strong effect of political views on beliefs
and concerns about environmental issues, especially the
issue of climate change (Leiserowitz 2005; Hamilton
2008; Hamilton et al. 2012; McCright 2011; McCright
et al. 2014; Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014). Additionally,
beliefs about the reality and cause of climate change
have been shown to influence perceptions of local tem-
perature and weather patterns (Cutler 2015, 2016; Howe
and Leiserowitz 2013; Howe 2018).
At the same time, a rich literature has emerged
demonstrating that racial and ethnicminorities are often
more vulnerable to environmental hazards (Bullard and
Johnson 2000; Cutter et al. 2003; Brulle and Pellow 2006;
Klinenberg 2015; Bolin and Kurtz 2018) and demon-
strating individual and geographically based influences
on risk perceptions of hazards (e.g., White 1945; Kates
1962; Kasperson and Dow 1993; Slovic 1993; Hamilton
and Keim 2009; Marlon et al. 2018). There have been
relatively few studies, however, that focus on racial and
ethnic differences in heat wave risk perceptions as a
characteristic of individual-level vulnerability. More
broadly, there have been several studies documenting a
‘‘white male’’ and ‘‘conservative white male effect’’ of
relatively low-risk perceptions across a variety of haz-
ards (Finucane et al. 2000; Kahan et al. 2007; McCright
and Dunlap 2013).
Among other sociodemographic correlates, older age
has been associated with increased risk for adverse
health consequences of extreme heat exposure, in ad-
dition to other hazards (Reid et al. 2009; Johnson et al.
2012; Klinenberg 2015; Gronlund et al. 2016). But risk
perception studies have not found older age to be as-
sociated with increased risk perceptions of climate
change (Leiserowitz 2006; Akerlof et al. 2015). While
age is a factor in vulnerability to heat, older people do
not appear to be more likely to view themselves as at
increased risk for heat-related health problems, perhaps
in part because they often do not perceive themselves to
be ‘‘old’’ (Abrahamson et al. 2009). As referenced
above, men tend to have lower perceptions of risks as-
sociated with environmental hazards, but women also
tend to express greater concern about environmental
issues more generally (Dunlap and Van Liere 1984;
Stern et al. 1993; Stern andDietz 1994; Dietz et al. 2005),
as well as the impacts of climate change specifically
(Hamilton 2008; Hamilton and Keim 2009; McCright
2010; Goebbert et al. 2012).
Educational attainment typically exerts a direct in-
fluence on concern about environmental issues, such
that more educated individuals tend to express greater
concerns or risk perceptions (Dunlap and Van Liere
1984; Jones and Dunlap 1992). Education and scientific
literacy, however, also interact with politics, such that
higher educational attainment among self-identified
Republicans or political conservatives corresponds to
lower perceived risks and less concern about environ-
mental issues, which may indicate motivated reasoning
(Hamilton 2008; Hamilton et al. 2012; Hamilton and
Saito 2015; McCright and Dunlap 2011; McCright 2011;
Krosnick et al. 2000; Malka et al. 2009; Shao et al. 2014).
Finally, lower household income at the individual
level is associated with increased perceived local im-
pacts of climate change and related environmental
phenomena (Hamilton and Keim 2009; Cutler 2015,
2016; Shao et al. 2016, 2014). In fact, recent research has
shown a multiplicative effect of household income and
local property damage from severe weather on percep-
tions of extreme weather events and the threat of cli-
mate change, such that individuals living in low-income
households in the most heavily impacted places express
greater awareness of and concern about personal risk
and property damage from severe weather events
(Cutler 2015, 2016). Income has often been incorporated
in broader indices intended to capture social vulnera-
bility to environmental hazards, but such studies gen-
erally utilize geographically based measures of income,
such as median or per capita household income aggre-
gated to subregion or substate geographic areas (Cutter
et al. 2003; Cutter and Finch 2008; Johnson et al. 2012;
Boruff et al. 2005; Wood et al. 2010). There have been
very few, if any, prior attempts to look at both individual
household income and broader geographical area in-
come together in studies of perceptions of environ-
mental hazards. The advantage of this approach is that it
can capture the possible effect of socioeconomic context
at the geographic level on individual-level perceptions
of vulnerability. Variables associated with social context
at the geographic level (i.e., employment structure,
community characteristics, levels of social trust and al-
truism) have been identified as important predictors of
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public beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions about social
and environmental issues (Hamilton et al. 2010; Safford
et al. 2012; Sampson 2012). This study addresses a crit-
ical gap in the literature by specifically investigating
whether geographically based socioeconomic context
matters to individual perceptions of personal and com-
munity vulnerability to heat waves, an increasingly im-
portant public health concern.
c. Geographic and biophysical influences on risk
perceptions
While much of the prior literature has focused on
individual-level factors as predictors of environmental at-
titudes and risk perceptions in general, less attention has
focused specifically on the socioeconomic anddemographic
influences on heat wave risk perceptions, especially the
potential geographic-level socioeconomic factors that can
put some individuals in positions of increased risk for harm.
Perceptions are an important determinant of responses to
risks, so an improved understanding of the drivers of risk
perceptions can clarify how climate change impacts may
affect individuals and populations (Leiserowitz 2005;
Thomas et al. 2007;Whitmarsh 2008;Weber 2010;Wilhelmi
and Hayden 2010).
The human dynamics of hazards can be conceptual-
ized through the lens of social vulnerability, which has
been defined as ‘‘. . .the sensitivity of a population to
natural hazards and its ability to respond to and recover
from the impacts of hazards’’ (Cutter and Finch 2008).
Using county-level socioeconomic and demographic
data, Cutter et al. (2003) constructed one of the first
comprehensive measures of social vulnerability to en-
vironmental hazards, the social vulnerability index
(SoVI). The SoVI combined factors related to personal
wealth, age, density of the built environment, single-
sector economic dependence, housing stock and ten-
ancy, race, ethnicity, occupation, and a hybrid construct
comprising employment in infrastructure and local debt-
to-revenue ratios (Cutter et al. 2003).
SoVI has since been utilized extensively to map and
analyze vulnerability at various scales and over various
periods of time (Boruff et al. 2005; Cutter et al. 2006;
Cutter and Emrich 2006; Boruff and Cutter 2007; Cutter
and Finch 2008; Wood et al. 2010) and has also been
adapted to include other measures of vulnerability, in-
cluding actual heat exposure through the incorporation
of land surface temperature data (Johnson et al. 2012).
Reid et al. (2009) specifically mapped heat-related vul-
nerability (but not perceptions of vulnerability) in urban
census tracts across the United States using an approach
similar to Cutter et al. (2003); they identified four types
of vulnerability factors, including social/environmental
variables (e.g., education and poverty), social isolation,
lack of air conditioning, and proportion of elderly with
diabetes.
While SoVI and related indicators have helped explain
geographic variation in environmental hazards vulnera-
bility, they also have the potential to serve as important
predictors of perceptions of vulnerability to environ-
mental hazards, especially heat waves. Where studies
have documented the link between actual and perceived
vulnerabilities, they have found that particularly vulner-
able populations, such as racial and ethnic minorities, are
more likely to perceive risks from environmental hazards
(Akerlof et al. 2015). However, this link between per-
ceived and actual vulnerabilities to environmental haz-
ards has also been relatively underexplored (Brody et al.
2008; Wolf et al. 2010; Spence et al. 2011). Perceptions of
risks have been analyzed as correlates of personal values,
worldviews, and other culturally rooted cognitive pro-
cesses at the individual level, but geographically based
factors and, specifically, social vulnerability have received
less attention, perhaps due to a lack of data availability at
various spatial and geographic units and/or because relevant
social-psychological theories of environmental attitudes and
risk perceptions tend to focus on individuals rather than
geographic areas as their units of analysis. Yet, individual-
level values are often embedded in geographically specific
contexts and connected to locally relevant phenomena,
such as cultural milieu, history, economic vibrancy, and
patterns of integration or segregation, among other factors
(GuagnanoandMarkee 1995;Kitchin et al. 1997; Lorenzoni
and Pidgeon 2006; Shwom et al. 2008; Hamilton and Keim
2009; Hamilton et al. 2010; Safford et al. 2012; Sampson
2012; Chuang et al. 2013; Hamilton and Safford 2015).
Local weather and climate—including temperature
and humidity—are another set of geographically based
factors that may influence heat wave health risk per-
ceptions. Several recent studies document linkages be-
tween observational weather and climate data and
public perceptions of those events in the context of an-
thropogenic climate change. Using 2012 national survey
data, Howe et al. (2014) overlaid public perceptions and
reported personal experience with hurricanes, torna-
does, and drought onto maps of observed impacts from
each of the three event types and found that personal
experience corresponds well with the geographic dis-
tribution of reported impacts, particularly for hurricanes
and tornadoes.
Event trends have also been included in models pre-
dicting perceptions of weather events. Goebbert et al.
(2012) used trends in temperature and the Palmer drought
severity index (PDSI) by zip code with individual-level
sociodemographic information from a national survey to
analyze local climate perceptions. Perceptions of temper-
ature were not significantly associated with actual changes
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in the weather, but respondents who lived in areas with
higher 3-yr-average departures in the PDSI from the 30-yr
average were more likely to perceive local flooding and
drought (Goebbert et al. 2012). Other research suggests
that trends in local temperatures, both in theUnited States
and cross nationally, correspond with perceptions of local
warming specifically (Hamilton and Keim 2009; Howe
et al. 2013; Howe and Leiserowitz 2013) and beliefs about
climate change more generally (Myers et al. 2013; Egan
andMullin 2012; Hamilton and Stampone 2013; Hamilton
and Lemcke-Stampone 2014; Shao 2016; Shao et al. 2016).
Evidence for a recency bias has also been demonstrated
through research on perceptions of changes in hurricane
strength, consistent with research showing that recent ex-
periences may be more influential to perceptions than
trends over time (Weber 2010; Shao et al. 2016).
There have also been efforts to incorporate data on
weather extremes in studies of public perceptions of
weather events and climate change, but little consensus
has been achieved as to which events affect perceptions
most or which measures are most useful. Brody et al.
(2008) examined several different factors related to ex-
treme weather vulnerabilities, including economic and
property damages, injuries, fatalities, and fires, and found
that the number of fatalities and economic damages in
excess of $1 billion was associated with perceptions of
personal and local risks from climate change. Yet,
Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2014) used the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Climate
Extremes Index (CEI) and found that the regional-level
measure did not significantly predict public beliefs about
the seriousness and timing of climate change impacts net
of political identity and other sociodemographic factors.
Similarly, Brulle et al. (2012) did not find any significant
relationship between NOAA’s CEI at the national level
and a ‘‘climate change threat index’’ constructed from
multiple survey items intended tomeasure aggregateU.S.
national opinion about the threat posed by climate
change. Shao and Goidel (2016) also demonstrated that
political orientation is the primary driver of perceptions
of local weather conditions, and in turn, those perceptions
overshadow objective weather conditions in influencing
attitudes about climate. While studies utilizing survey
research on public opinion about climate change have
often included biophysical factors, many lack finescale
geographic data to identify specific impacts within re-
spondents’ own areas. A key component missing from all
of these studies is a focus on public perceptions of the
health risks associated with climate and weather ex-
tremes, especially in the context of social and physical
vulnerabilities.
This research investigates four interrelated hypotheses
basedon the theoretical insights from theprior literature on
climate change risk perceptions and the geographically
varying social and physical conditions related to environ-
mental hazards vulnerabilities. First, we expect individual
ideological orientations and beliefs about climate change to
exert the largest influence over perceptions of the health
risks associated with heat waves, such that conservatives
who are skeptical about the reality and cause of climate
changewill bemuch less likely to perceive health risks from
heat waves than liberals who believe climate change is real
and human caused. Second, we expect that individual-level
socioeconomic factors, such as race/ethnicity, income, age,
and gender, will all exert significant influences on heatwave
health risk perceptions net of ideological factors. Third, we
expect that geographically based socioeconomic factors
associated with hazards vulnerability will exert some level
of influence on individual-level risk perceptions, such that
those living in more socioeconomically vulnerable places
will perceive greater risks from heat waves. Finally, we
expect to find a relationship between observed heat con-
ditions and perceptions of risks, such that those living in
areas more heavily impacted by extreme heat conditions




This study utilizes two waves of the biannual, na-
tionally representative Climate Change in the American
Mind (CCAM) surveys, conducted by the Yale Program
on Climate Change Communication and the Center for
Climate Change Communication at George Mason
University. The CCAM surveys have tracked public
beliefs and attitudes about climate change and a wide
range of associated issues and topical areas, such as risk
perceptions, media consumption habits, policy prefer-
ences, and many others (Leiserowitz et al. 2018). There
have been 18 waves of CCAM data collected since fall
2008. While some items have been tracked throughout
CCAM’s deployment, most survey questions have been
asked more selectively. This research uses two of the 18
waves wherein the survey items that serve as the de-
pendent variables were assessed. Descriptive informa-
tion, including sample size and data collection dates, for
each wave is provided in Table 1. Samples were drawn
from GfK’s KnowledgePanel, an online panel of mem-
bers recruited using probability sampling via random
digit dialing and address-based mail techniques that
cover essentially all resident phone numbers and mail
addresses in the United States. Survey questionnaires
were self-administered by respondents through a web-
based environment. Those sampled who chose to join
the panel but did not have access to the internet at home
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were loaned personal computers and provided with internet
access in order to participate so that the web-based design
would not systematically exclude certain segments of the
population.Postsurveyweightswereapplied todemographic
variables to match the U.S. Census Bureau’s norms.
b. Dependent variables
This study analyzes individuals’ perceptions of the
impacts that a heat wave would have on their own per-
sonal health and the health of those in their communi-
ties. The dependent variables were constructed from
two survey questions aimed at assessing respondents’
perceptions about the extent to which a heat wave would
have an impact on their own personal health or the
health of those within their communities. These survey
questions,1 assessed in the October 2015 (n5 1344) and
November 2016 (n 5 1226) CCAM surveys, included a
brief preface, ‘‘A heat wave is a period of unusually and
uncomfortably hot weather,’’ and then proceeded to ask
respondents, ‘‘If a heat wave were to occur in your local
area, how much, if at all, do you think it would harm the
following,’’ with reference to their own personal health
and the health of others in their communities. Re-
spondents were not provided with any higher level of
specificity regarding how long the ‘‘period of unusually
and uncomfortably hot weather’’ referred to, in part
because subjective experience of heat waves may differ
from technical definitions provided by agencies moni-
toring such events. Respondents were provided a slider
bar with values on a scale from 0 to 100 and asked to use
the slider to indicate ‘‘how much’’ a heat wave would
impact each. The October 2015 and November 2016
waves of CCAM were the first in which these two items
had been assessed.2
c. Independent variables and individual-level
vulnerability
Independent variables at the individual level included
diverse sociodemographic indicators, respondents’ be-
liefs about global warming, and ideological identifica-
tion. Census division of residence (based on the nine
Census divisions3) and an indicator of survey wave
TABLE 1. Independent variables from CCAM surveys.
Variable Range Mean (standard deviation) N
Individual-level characteristics
Age 1 (18–29), 2 (30–44), 3 (45–59), 4 (601) 2.856 (1.072) 2556
Gender 0 (male), 1 (female) 0.517 (0.500) 2556
Education 1 (,high school), 2 (high school), 3
(some college), 4 (Bachelor’s or higher)
2.933 (0.968) 2556
Household income 1 (,$25,000), 2 ($25,000–$34,999), 3
($35,000–$49,999), 4 ($50,000–$74,999),
5 ($75,000–$99,999), 6 ($100,0001)
3.985 (1.786) 2556
Race/ethnicity 1 (white, non-Hispanic), 2 (Hispanic),
3 (African American, non-Hispanic),
4 (other/multiracial)
— 2556
Ideology 1 (very liberal), 2 (somewhat liberal),
3 (moderate), 4 (somewhat
conservative), 5 (very conservative)
3.129 (1.075) 2525
Global warming belief 1 (human caused–reference category),
2 (natural), 3 (not happening),
4 (other belief/do not know)
— 2555
Census division and CCAM survey wave
Census division 1 (New England), 2 (Mid-Atlantic),
3 (East-North Central), 4 (West-North
Central), 5 (South Atlantic), 6
(East-South Central), 7 (West-South
Central), 8 (Mountain), 9 (Pacific)
— 2556
Survey wave 0 (Nov 2016), 1 (Oct 2015) 0.520 (0.500) 2556
1 The survey questions on risks of harm from heat waves came
before the suite of questions on climate change beliefs and atti-
tudes, thus eliminating the possibility of biasing responses in one
direction.
2 Given that these surveys were the first time these items had
been assessed, no prior knowledge had been generated about how
individuals would tend to respond to the scale and slider bar format
presented for this particular pair of questions.
3 https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/
us_regdiv.pdf.
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participation were also included to account for spatial and
temporal variability among survey respondents. All in-
dependent variables derived from CCAM survey data are
described in Table 1. A categorical indicator for racial and
ethnic identities was created from a five-category nominal
variable that reported respondents’ race or ethnicity. In
addition to race and ethnicity, other sociodemographic
indicators at the individual level included respondents’
age, gender, education, and household income.
Finally, among individual-level predictors, this anal-
ysis included individuals’ self-reported political ideology
and beliefs about the reality and cause of global warm-
ing. Political ideology is treated as a five-category ordi-
nal measure, from ‘‘very liberal’’ to ‘‘very conservative.’’
The variable used to indicate global warming beliefs was
derived from an original survey item that asked re-
spondents whether they believed global warming is
mostly due to 1) human causes, 2) natural changes in the
environment, 3) neither because it is not happening, or
4) respondents could indicate that they were either un-
sure or had another belief about the cause of global
warming. Human causation was treated as the reference
category in the four-category nominal variable used in
statistical models because initial bivariate analysis re-
vealed this response option to have the greatest positive
correlation with responses to the dependent variable,
thus facilitating interpretation of the results.
d. Geographically based vulnerability
To capture the possible influence of geographically
based social vulnerability on perceptions of heat wave
risks, a proxy measure of vulnerability was utilized in-
formed by the prior literature on SoVI and related in-
dices (Cutter et al. 2003, 2008, 2010; Johnson et al. 2012;
Schmidtlein et al. 2008). The variables used to construct
the measure were derived from the 2014 American
Community Survey’s (ACS) 5-yr census tract estimates.
These census tract data were matched to survey re-
spondents utilizing jittered (6150m) coordinates for
respondents’ household addresses. The ACS variables
used to construct this measure included the percentage
of nonwhite residents, the percentage of residents with
less than a high school education, median age, median
household income, the percentage of residents below
the federal poverty line, the percentage of Hispanic
residents, population density, and the unemployment
rate. The choice of this set of variables was primarily
informed by Johnson et al.’s (2012, p. 25) extreme heat
vulnerability index (EHVI). The sociodemographic
variables utilized in our proxy measure cover the major
components of EHVI, which accounted for about 73%
of explained variance and included age, race/ethnicity,
household income, education, and population density
(Johnson et al. 2012). Table 2 displays descriptive in-
formation for each of the variables used to construct this
proxy measure of heat vulnerability. Not only do these
cover the major components of prior indices, including
racial and ethnic composition, age structure, urban
density, and socioeconomic status, but these variables
are also considered among the most ‘‘prevalent in-
dicators of vulnerability’’ in the context of extreme heat
(Johnson et al. 2012). Standard scores (Z scores) were
calculated for each variable prior to inclusion, and the
entire set of Z scores was summed to produce a single
measure for each respondents’ census tract. The Cron-
bach’s alpha for the scale was 0.74, indicating a sufficient
degree of internal reliability. While Cronbach’s alpha
does not test for dimensionality as principal compo-
nents analysis does, this set of variables was previously
determined to represent three highly intercorrelated
components of an index of extreme heat vulnerability
(Johnson et al. 2012). A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74 is
generally considered a high-degree shared covariance
and likely demonstrates that this proxy measure in-
dicates an underlying construct: geographically based
social vulnerability.
e. Biophysical variables
Biophysical variables included in this study came from
two derived measures of heat incidence and intensity: 1)
cooling degree-days (CDD) and 2) the heat stress index
(HSI). Data on CDD were obtained from NOAA’s
Climate Prediction Center (CPC). These data are pro-
vided at the level of the climate division, a substate
TABLE 2. Geographically based vulnerability: 2014 ACS 5-yr census tract estimates.
Variable Range Mean (standard deviation) N
Percent nonwhite 0–100 20.23 (21.21) 2544
Percent less than high school education 0–100 15.20 (11.61) 2539
Median age 15.8–78.2 39.14 (7.23) 2542
Median household income $3,576–$108,472 $30,809.61 ($11,862.11) 2542
Percent below poverty 0–100 14.06 (11.33) 2543
Percent Hispanic 0–100 14.45 (19.16) 2544
Population density 0–154 454.9 4486.36 (10 888.63) 2545
Unemployment rate 0–100 8.90 (5.55) 2542
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geographic area. Descriptive statistics for the biophysical
variables are provided in Table 3. There are 344 climate
divisions in the United States. Monthly temperature and
precipitation values are computed from daily station ob-
servations in each division. According to NOAA’s CPC,
CDD are defined as ‘‘a quantitative index demonstrated to
reflect demand for energy to. . . cool houses andbusinesses’’
and are the summation of positive differences between the
mean daily temperature and a base of 658F. To illustrate
how these data might look, the CPC provides the example
that ‘‘cooling degree days for a station with daily mean
temperatures during a 7-day period of 67, 65, 70, 74, 78, 65,
and 68 are 2, 0, 5, 9, 13, 0, and 3, for a total for theweekof 32
cooling degree days.’’4 The CPC estimates degree-days for
substate climate divisions and applies populationweights to
accurately estimate temperature-related energy consump-
tion. The total CDD from the period of May–September
prior to their survey completion date were merged with
survey data according to each respondent’s climate di-
vision. The warmest months were selected in order to
control for the seasonal variability across the country that
could lead to inflated estimates for portions of the country
that experience warmth well before or after the summer
months. To also capture the potentially important influence
of abnormal May–September CDD, anomalies were cal-
culated as the departure of the total CDD from the 1981–
2013 averages by climate division for each respondent.
In addition to a measure of temperature-related en-
ergy use in warm months, this study incorporates a
measure of apparent ambient temperature, or ‘‘how
hot it feels’’ based on both temperature and humidity.
The National Centers for Environmental Information
(NCEI) at NOAA calculate an HSI using data on tem-
perature and humidity from hourly observations by the
187NationalWeather Service (NWS) stations across the
nation. These data are provided in the form of the av-
erage single-day exceedances above the 85th percentile
per month.5 In a similar fashion to the CDD, survey
respondents were matched with the HSI for their local
climate division for the months of May–September
preceding the survey date. Anomalies were calculated
to capture the departure from the 1981–2013 average
HSI and included in statistical models.
While a number of recent studies suggest a link between
temperature andweather and beliefs about climate change
(e.g., Howe et al. 2014; Cutler 2016; Shao et al. 2016), other
recent studies using measures of temperature trends,
flooding events, and climate extremes do not find that such
event types significantly predict public perceptions and
beliefs about climate-related phenomena (Brody et al.
2008;Goebbert et al. 2012;Hamilton et al. 2016;Marquart-
Pyatt et al. 2014). The novel approach of this study,
however, is to use CDD and HSI as measures of the
‘‘felt impacts’’ of rising temperatures. Since CDDs are
computed in reference to the point at which most people
turn onair conditioning, fans, or other energy-consumptive
cooling methods, higher average CDDs may capture the
human impact of heat better than raw temperatures or
anomalies. Likewise, HSI accounts for differences in hu-
midity that affect how hot it feels, adding information to
the absolute temperatures alone.
f. Analytical strategy
The distribution of responses on the continuous 0–100
scale was multimodal, with substantial proportions of
responses clustered below 20, between 20 and 40, be-
tween 40 and 60, and above 60. Therefore, the de-
pendent variable was treated as ordered categorical, and
ordered logistic regression was used to analyze the
individual-level and geographically based influences on
the outcome variable. This analytical choice may be
TABLE 3. NWS cooling degree-days (CDDs) and heat stress index (HSI).
Variable Range Mean (standard deviation) N
May–Sep CDDs
2015 CDD total 85–2757 1186.76 (692.83) 1321
2015 CDD anomaly 2484.61–319.82 69.60 (125.67) 1321
2016 CDD total 49–2817 1316.13 (692.42) 1210
2016 CDD anomaly 2456.61–550.70 188.83 (135.45) 1210
May–Sep HSI
2015 HSI total 0–65 23.29 (13.14) 1330
2015 HSI anomaly 227.64–37 7.11 (10.84) 1330
2016 HSI total 0–77 28.82 (13.37) 1226
2016 HSI anomaly 227.64–55.06 12.39 (11.17) 1226
4 http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/
cdus/degree_days/ddayexp.shtml. 5 https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/societal-impacts/heat-stress/data.
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limited in that it reduces the variability of responses to
the dependent variable and may lose important in-
formation as a result, but given that roughly 20%–25%
of respondents fell into each quarter of the 0–100 scale, it
was more appropriate to treat the variable as ordinal.
Since geographic predictor variables are included in
these statistical models, and survey responses may be
spatially autocorrelated, the ordered logistic regressions
were constructed as multilevel, mixed-effects models
with climate division set as a second-level random effect.
4. Findings
Results from weighted, mixed-effects ordered logistic
regressions of the individual- and geographic-level pre-
dictors on the dependent variables are reported in Table 4.
Odds ratios reported are in reference to 1.0, where
positive effects are above 1.0, and negative effects are
below 1.0. Positive odds ratios in Table 4 refer to the
multiplicative effects on the odds of a ‘‘60–100’’ re-
sponse on the heat wave harm slider bar for a unit in-
crease in the predictor versus the lower three ordered
categories of possible responses, ‘‘0–20,’’ ‘‘20–40,’’ or
‘‘40–60,’’ whereas negative ratios refer to the multipli-
cative effects on the odds of a ‘‘0–20’’ response versus
the combined ‘‘20–40,’’ ‘‘40–60,’’ and ‘‘60–100’’ cate-
gories. Indirect effects between all geographic- and
individual-level variables were tested using a stepwise
procedure and through the creation of interaction terms,
but we did not find any significant results to indicate
mediating or moderating influences of independent
variables on the dependent variable. Therefore, results
presented in Table 4 include only direct effects.
As hypothesized, political ideology and beliefs about
global warming each consistently predict respondents’
perceptions of the health risks from future heat waves.
Conservatives perceive personal or community health
risks from heat waves much less often than liberals. The
odds of ‘‘60–100’’ responses on the heat wave harm
slider bars for personal or community health were 11%
and 16% lower, respectively, with a unit increase in the
ideology indicator. Beliefs about global warming also
significantly predict heat wave health risk perceptions.
Belief in any cause other than the human causation of
global warming—including that global warming is a
natural phenomenon, that it is not happening at all, or
TABLE 4. Mixed-effects ordered logistic regressions of perceived health risks of heat waves on individual- and geographic-level char-
acteristics (pooled Oct 2015 and Nov 2016 CCAM surveys). Significance level: * is p , 0.05, ** is p , 0.01, *** is p , 0.001.
Model 1: ‘‘My health’’
Model 2: ‘‘Health of others in my
community’’
Independent variables Odds ratios (95% confidence) Odds ratio (95% confidence)
Individual characteristics
Age 1.170*** (1.092–1.254) 1.138*** (1.057–1.214)
Gender (female) 1.189* (1.025–1.379) 1.310*** (1.133–1.515)
Education 0.821*** (0.755–0.893) 0.914* (0.839–0.994)
Household income 0.876*** (0.836–0.917) 0.931** (0.890–0.975)
Ideology (very liberal–very conservative) 0.890** (0.823–0.961) 0.826*** (0.765–0.892)
Oct 2015 1.735*** (1.463–2.056) 1.079 (0.915–1.272)
White, non-Hispanic
Hispanic 1.309* (1.032–1.662) 1.150 (0.885–1.493)
African American 1.406** (1.084–1.825) 1.169 (0.874–1.565)
Other race/multiracial 1.984*** (1.465–2.686) 1.507** (1.114–2.040)
Global warming belief (Human)
Natural 0.624*** (0.526–0.740) 0.521*** (0.440–0.617)
Not happening 0.281*** (0.203–0.390) 0.235*** (0.170–0.326)
Do not know 0.418** (0.220–0.795) 0.351** (0.180–0.684)
Census division ns ns
Place characteristics
Vulnerability index 1.028* (1.002–1.055) 1.031* (1.005–1.059)
May–Sep 2015/16 CDD 1.000 (1.000–1.000) 1.000 (1.000–1.000)
May–Sep 2015/16 CDD anomaly 1.000 (0.999–1.001) 1.000 (0.999–1.001)
May–Sep 2015/16 HSI 0.994 (0.973–1.017) 0.998 (0.979–1.017)
May–Sep 2015/16 HSI anomaly 1.016 (0.990–1.043) 1.006 (0.983–1.029)
Random intercept
Climate division 0.038 0.000
N 2477 2477
Cut 1/Cut 2/Cut 3 21.457/20.200/1.092 22.280/20.759/0.830
Wald chi2 307.96*** 279.76***
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being unsure or having any other unclassified view-
point—results in much lower odds of reporting harm
from heat waves to personal or community health. The
belief that human-caused global warming is not hap-
pening, however, produces a much stronger negative
effect on the odds of perceiving heat wave harm to either
personal or community health. For example, the odds
of a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the slider bars indicating
harm to personal and community health are 72% and
74% lower, respectively, among those who believe
global warming is not happening at all versus happening
due to human causes, whereas the odds are 37% and
47% lower, respectively, among those who believe
global warming is happening, but due to natural causes
versus human causes.
In a similar fashion to ideology and global warming
beliefs, we did find evidence for the second hypothesized
relationship between individual-level sociodemographic
factors and perceptions of heat wave health risks.
Individual-level household incomes significantly predict
perceptions of the risks posed by future heat waves net of
other individual- and geographic-level variables. The
odds of a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the slider bar to personal
and community health decline by 12% and 7%, re-
spectively, for a single-unit increase in the six-point
household income indicator. For example, the odds of a
‘‘heat wave would cause harm to my personal health’’
response are 47% lower among individuals in households
with incomes greater than $100,000 (U.S. dollars) annu-
ally (0.885 5 0.53), compared to all other household in-
come categories in the six-point scale and controlling for
other variables. Thus, while ideological predispositions
are persistent and relatively strong predictors of per-
ceived harm from heat waves, individual-level vulnera-
bility as measured through household income is also
important. Educational attainment, another component
of socioeconomic status, is a significant predictor for
personal health risk perceptions. The odds of a ‘‘heat
wave would cause harm’’ response or a ‘‘60–100’’ re-
sponse on the harm slider bar are 16% and 18% lower,
respectively, for a unit increase in the four-point educa-
tional attainment indicator.
Respondents’ age and racial/ethnic identities also
predict perceptions of heat wave health risks. The odds
of a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the harm slider bars for
personal and community health increase by 17% and
14%, respectively, with a single-unit increase in the four-
category age indicator. Racial and ethnic identities, on
the other hand, have a more complex relationship to
heat wave health risk perceptions. In general, nonwhite
respondents are more likely than white respondents to
perceive heat waves as a personal health risk, but com-
munity health risk perceptions are higher only among
‘‘other’’ (any race/ethnicity other than white, African
American, or Hispanic) or multiracial respondents.
Among the hypothesized geographically based pre-
dictors, only socioeconomic vulnerability significantly
predicts perceptions of heat wave health risks. Predicted
values for personal health risk perceptions are plotted
against the mean vulnerability score in Fig. 1. As re-
ported in Table 1, the odds of responding ‘‘60–100’’ on
the slider bar for both personal and community health
risks increase by 3% with a single-point increase in the
vulnerability index, holding all other individual- and
geographic-level predictors constant. On the other
hand, none of the measures of ‘‘felt impacts’’ from re-
cent heat events, both total CDD or HSI and CDD or
HSI anomalies, had a direct influence over respondents’
perceptions of heat wave health risks. There are signif-
icant temporal effects, however, as indicated by the
variables for survey wave participation. For both per-
sonal and community health risk perceptions, survey
participation in the month of October versus November
increases the odds of perceived health risks from heat
waves. Thus, there may be a recency effect of summer
heat on perceptions of heat waves. Finally, the random
effect of climate division is not significantly predictive of
heat wave health risk perceptions in any of the models
tested. While it is not a significant predictor, the in-
clusion of climate division as a level in a multilevel
model did help to ensure that the effects from the geo-
graphically based CDD andHSI variables, as well as the
vulnerability indices, were not biased due to latent
spatial clustering of similar responses. Latent spatial
clustering in this context refers to the likelihood that
individuals in close spatial proximity to each other may
tend to respond in similar fashion—a phenomenon also
referred to as positive spatial autocorrelation. This can
be a problem in prediction models because observations
FIG. 1. Predicted individual perceptions of personal health risks of
heat waves by geographic-level vulnerability.
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are assumed to be independent from one another, and
the presence of positive spatial autocorrelation would
violate this assumption. Finally, none of the nine Census
division dummy variables (simply denoted as ‘‘ns’’ in
Table 4 to reduce the visual complexity) predict risk
perceptions, and this corresponds with the lack of a
second-level effect in climate division as well.
5. Discussion
This study contributes to the literature on public climate
change and heat wave risk perceptions by integrating
individual-level survey data with geographic-level bio-
physical and social vulnerability data to better understand
the combined influences of social, geographic, and physi-
cal factors on individuals’ perceptions of heat waves. Prior
studies have typically taken only one of these approaches,
examining sociodemographic predictors alone, combining
biophysical and survey data, or investigating the extent of
social vulnerability to environmental hazards (Van Liere
and Dunlap 1980; Cutter et al. 2003; Hamilton and Keim
2009; Howe et al. 2014; Cutler 2015). This study combines
insights from all three approaches to compare and con-
trast these different influences on public perceptions
about the health risks of heat waves.We found that global
warming beliefs and political and ideological factors, as
well as individual- and geographic-level socioeconomic
vulnerabilities, influence individuals’ perceptions about
the health risks posed by heat waves to themselves and
others in their communities.
This study also provides new evidence that climate
change concern is related to risk perceptions of related
phenomena such as heat waves. This is an important
finding because it suggests that the experience of heat
wave events can be interpreted through individuals’
ideological lenses. Although previous research has high-
lighted the importance influences of political orientation
on climate change risk perceptions (e.g., Hamilton 2011;
McCright and Dunlap 2011), this analysis shows that ex-
treme heat events may also become politicized phenom-
ena, affecting individuals’ assessments of their own
vulnerability to heat. If true, this dynamic should inform
efforts to promote awareness about the health conse-
quences of prolonged heat exposure.
The importance of multiple indicators of vulnerability,
including household income, educational attainment, ra-
cial and ethnic background, and age—all at the individual
level—as well as measures of hazards and social vulner-
ability at the census tract level, in predicting individuals’
perceptions of the health risks posed by heat waves to
themselves and others in their communities is consistent
with the extant literature (Akerlof et al. 2010, 2015;
Maibach et al. 2015; Cutler 2016). Individuals living in
households with higher incomes perceive less risk from
future heat waves, suggesting that higher-income house-
holds have greater ability to protect against heat wave
events, such as the ability to afford energy-intensive air
conditioning over several days, or even having the ability
to purchase such appliances or afford homes with air
conditioning in the first place (Reid et al. 2009).
Interestingly, income predicts both perceived per-
sonal and community health risks, suggesting that
household income to some extent also captures resi-
dential segregation based on socioeconomic status. In
other words, individuals tend to live in neighborhoods
alongside others with similar income levels to their own,
thus precipitating a feeling of shared context, whether
that context is one of relative risk or security. The sig-
nificant influence of the index of geographically based
socioeconomic vulnerability provides additional evi-
dence that perceptions of vulnerability to climate-
related hazards are ‘‘emplaced’’ (Gieryn 2000) along
with other related concentrated social inequalities, such
as income, wealth, deviance, and other geographically
relevant social phenomena. In demonstrating a link
between geographically based vulnerability and per-
ceptions of heat wave health risks, this study contributes
to a growing body of scholarship about the relationship
between characteristics of ‘‘place,’’ or geography, and
perceived environmental changes, risks, and hazards
(Hamilton and Keim 2009; Howe et al. 2013; Goebbert
et al. 2012; Howe and Leiserowitz 2013; Howe et al.
2014; Cutler 2016; Shao et al. 2016). Income and edu-
cation are generally highly correlated at individual and
area levels, so it is not surprising that the effect of
individual-level educational attainment also signifi-
cantly predicts perceptions of health risks associated
with heat waves. Individuals with lower levels of edu-
cational attainment more often perceive risks to their
own health and the health of others within their com-
munities from future heat waves. Individuals with higher
educational attainment are more likely to work in pro-
fessional or managerial occupations that do not require
them to labor outdoors during extreme heat.
Other potential vulnerabilities such as racial and ethnic
background and age that often predict environmental risk
perceptions (Klineberg et al. 1998; Greenberg 2005;
Akerlof et al. 2015) are significant though less-consistent
predictors of risk perceptions. Hispanic and African
American respondents are more likely to perceive heat
wave health risks to themselves, but not for risks to others
in their communities, as compared to white respondents.
More reliably, those who identify with any other racial or
ethnic background, or two or more racial categories,
much more often perceive personal health risks of
heat waves for both themselves and others in their
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communities. While this research is unable to disaggre-
gate the ‘‘other’’ racial category, these findings suggest a
potentially important new avenue for future research
with respect to racial and ethnic differences in the per-
ceptions of risks associated with climate change. Racial
and ethnic differences in heat wave perceptions require a
deeper investigation than this study is able to provide.
Prior research has demonstrated that race and ethnicity
matter in terms of vulnerabilities to environmental haz-
ards (Brulle and Pellow 2006; Cutter et al. 2006), but it is
less clear how perceptions are shaped within these more
vulnerable racial and ethnic minority communities.
While individual-level socioeconomic characteristics
predict heat wave health risk perceptions, especially
household income, geographically based socioeconomic
characteristics also predict individual risk perceptions.
Individuals living in census tracts with higher social
vulnerability more often perceive health risks to them-
selves and others in their communities. Not only do in-
dividuals who are more socioeconomically vulnerable as
indicated by their own incomes perceive more risk to
themselves and others in their communities, but the
socioeconomic status of those surrounding them also
appears to influence their perceptions of these vulnera-
bilities. This finding indicates that risk perceptions are
influenced not just by individual-level, social-psychological
processes, but also broader, macrolevel processes in-
volving neighborhood- or community-level dynamics,
such as socioeconomic circumstances. Whereas prior
research has either assessed aggregate social vulnera-
bilities of geographic areas to environmental hazards
(e.g., Reid et al. 2009) or the effect of individual-level
vulnerabilities on risk perceptions (e.g., Bord and
O’Connor 1997), this study illustrates the importance of
both micro- and macrolevel vulnerabilities.
The results regarding vulnerability and risk percep-
tions also have important implications for communica-
tion and public health campaigns aimed at reducing
heat-related mortality and illnesses. In their review of
NOAANWS extreme heat warnings methods, Hawkins
et al. (2017) find that weather forecasters often report
confusion from the inconsistent heat products from
NWS and inflexibility with respect to local conditions
and impacts. However, given regional variability of cli-
mate and the heterogeneity of social, environmental,
and infrastructural circumstances across the United
States, Hawkins and colleagues note that a national
standardization of heat warnings and communications
would be ‘‘unfeasible and inappropriate’’ (Hawkins
et al. 2017). They do note, however, that the NWS has
undertaken efforts to collaborate with local health de-
partments and officials to emphasize important heat-
related health issues and local context (i.e., urban heat
island effect) in extreme heat warnings to the general
public. The results of our study have implications for
efforts such as these by policy makers and stakeholders
who are concerned with the public health risks of heat
waves. Evidence from our study can be used to inform
policy approaches to the communication of heat haz-
ards, specifically that communication strategies should
take into consideration the role of individual- and geo-
graphically based vulnerabilities, as well as political at-
titudes about heat and climate change, in shaping
perceptions of heat wave health impacts. These insights
can help improve the design of communication strate-
gies to increase awareness about the health conse-
quences of heat exposure.
In addition to the consideration of political ideology,
climate change beliefs, and social and economic vul-
nerability, this study incorporated multiple measures of
what might be considered the ‘‘felt impacts’’ of heat or
heat wave events. By geolocating survey respondents
and integrating CDD and HSI data into statistical
models as fixed effects of heat incidence and severity,
this study assessed the extent to which the direct, ex-
perienced impacts of extreme heat might influence in-
dividuals’ evaluations of the health risks. Contrary to the
fourth hypothesized relationship, no evidence of a direct
link between these measures of the felt impacts of heat
and perceptions of heat wave health risks was found.
The lack of any influence on risk perceptions from
measures of actual exposure underscores the need for
more research on the most appropriate measures of
exposure to weather events and other climate-related
phenomena. It may be the case that certain physical
environmental indicators can illuminate how individuals
experience such phenomena, but it may also be possible
that such an effect cannot be reliably captured by any
particular measure of climate-related impacts, and as
such a more comprehensive index of multiple indicators
might be worth exploring. It may also be the case that
our measures of ‘‘felt impacts’’ do not account for pos-
sible individual-level variability that could be captured
by measures at higher resolutions (e.g., more localized
effects than the climate division is able to provide).
Additionally, more in-depth survey work, or perhaps
ethnographic field work and case studies, could identify
cultural or other geographically dependent social in-
dicators of risk perceptions. Alternatively, such work
could also uncover important geographically specific,
sociocultural, and economic factors that constrain risk
perceptions among individuals living in the warmest
parts of the South, Midwest, or West, or perhaps in the
Northeast, where the greatest mismatch between per-
ceptions and actual incidence of heat events may soon
develop due to a changing climate.
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This study provides evidence that Americans’ per-
ceptions of heat wave risks are substantially shaped by
ideological predispositions and beliefs about the reality
of global warming but are also linked to their own per-
sonal socioeconomic characteristics and the socioeco-
nomic structure of the places in which they live. As the
climate changes and the impacts of severe weather-
related events increase, ideological influences and so-
cioeconomic vulnerabilities will be crucial to understand
in order to develop the most effective communication
strategies about the risks posed by a warming planet.
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